

Honeynet.org Scan of the Month 31

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A. Tools and Methodology

1. Tools

- Common Unix utilities such as *gawk*, *sed*, *sort*, *uniq*
- *gcc*
- *google.com*
- *MySQL*
- *Webalizer* + *GeoIP*

2. Methodology

First of all *Webalizer* was used to generate a high-level report from the *access_log* file. Then a short program was written to read each entry in *access_log* and insert it into a *MySQL* database (source code for the program can be found in Appendix B). From then on most analyzes were carried out by issuing SQL queries on the database and some manual inspection of the *audit_log* file, with the help of the search engine *google.com*.

B. Answers to Questions

1. How do you think the attackers found the honeyproxy?

The following are some possible means:

a) Proxy scanners

The attacker might have used proxy scanners like *pxys*, *ProxyJudge* and *YAPH* on a large range of addresses and found the honeyproxy.

b) Port scanning

The attacker might have port-scanned a large range of hosts on well-known proxy ports such as TCP 3128 and 8080 and found the honeyproxy.

c) Free proxy list

There are many publicly available “free proxy lists” such as *free-proxies.com*. It could be that this honeyproxy was on one of these lists.

2. What different types of attacks can you identify? For each category, provide just one log example and detail as much info about the attack as possible (such as CERT/CVE/Anti-Virus id numbers). How many can you find?

a) Anonymity checking

```
Request: 213.112.232.43 - - [Tue Mar 9 23:48:49 2004] "GET
http://hpcgil.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi HTTP/1.0" 200 2046
Handler: proxy-server
-----
GET http://hpcgil.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi HTTP/1.0
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, */*
Host: hpcgil.nifty.com
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html
X-Cache: MISS from www.testproxy.net
Connection: close
```

The target is a web page for checking the anonymity of the requester's HTTP connection.

b) IRC proxying

```
Request: 63.76.191.200 - - [Thu Mar 11 15:05:03 2004] "CONNECT irc.webchat.org:6667
HTTP/1.0" 200 0
Handler: proxy-server
-----
CONNECT irc.webchat.org:6667 HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 (null)
```

This instance shows an attacker connecting to an IRC server through the honeyproxy. The reason for doing this was probably to launch attacks or to avoid being attacked by other users. Since this trick has been used a lot in the past to launch attacks, many IRC servers actually employ a countermeasure against this, namely to check whether the requester IP belongs to an open proxy. Such checking was recorded by the audit log and can be identified by user agents

with names such as *pxyscand*, which is a proxy scanner. One such instance is shown below:

```
Request: 193.109.122.27 - - [Thu Mar 11 12:54:25 2004] "CONNECT 193.109.122.67:6668
HTTP/1.0" 403 290
Handler: proxy-server
-----
CONNECT 193.109.122.67:6668 HTTP/1.0
User-Agent: pxyscand/2.0

HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

c) ICQ proxying

```
Request: 195.16.40.200 - - [Wed Mar 10 19:13:39 2004] "CONNECT login.icq.com:443
HTTP/1.0" 200 0
Handler: proxy-server
-----
CONNECT login.icq.com:443 HTTP/1.0

HTTP/1.0 (null)
```

Many such instances can be seen in the audit log. In fact *login.icq.com* was the top target in terms of number of hits. The attackers might want to proxy their ICQ connection for several purposes:

- To send SPAM / harassment / blackmail messages
- To carry out brute force / dictionary password attacks
- To hide their IP addresses from other ICQ users to avoid being attacked or preserve privacy regarding their whereabouts
- To use stolen accounts

d) Brute force password attacks

```
Request: 65.66.156.226 - - [Wed Mar 10 02:21:57 2004] "GET
http://login.korea.yahoo.com/config/login?.redir_from=PROFILES?&.tries=1&.src=jpg&.las
t=&promo=&.intl=us&.bypass=&.partner=&.chkP=Y&.done=http://jpager.yahoo.com/jpager/pag
er2.shtml&login=_____420_____&passwd=cheater HTTP/1.0" 200 566
Handler: proxy-server
Error: mod_security: pausing
[http://login.korea.yahoo.com/config/login?.redir_from=PROFILES?&.tries=1&.src=
jpg&.last=&.promo=&.intl=us&.bypass=&.partner=&.chkP=Y&.done=http://jpager.yahoo.com/jpager/pager2.shtml&login=_____420_____&passwd=ch
eater] for 50000 ms
-----
GET
http://login.korea.yahoo.com/config/login?.redir_from=PROFILES?&.tries=1&.src=jpg&.las
t=&promo=&.intl=us&.bypass=&.partner=&.chkP=Y&.done=http://jpager.yahoo.com/jpager/pag
er2.shtml&login=_____420_____&passwd=cheater HTTP/1.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
Connection: Keep-Alive
mod_security-message: Access denied with code 200. Pattern match "passwd=" at
THE_REQUEST.
mod_security-action: 200
```

```
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

This is a brute force password attack on the web login interface of *yahoo.com*. The proof is that the same pattern of URL request was sent 162 times, each with a different login name, by the same host within about 2 seconds, as shown below:

```
mysql> select inet_ntoa(src), count(*), min(ts), max(ts) from access_log where req
like '%yahoo.co%passwd=cheater%' group by
src order by src;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| inet_ntoa(src) | count(*) | min(ts)          | max(ts)          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 65.66.156.226  |      162 | 2004-04-23 15:16:33 | 2004-04-23 15:16:34 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (7.32 sec)
```

e) Top site listing cheating

```
Request: 195.161.118.212 - - [Thu Mar 11 07:14:37 2004] "GET
http://counter.rambler.ru/top100.cnt?519854 HTTP/1.1" 200 951
Handler: proxy-server
-----
GET http://counter.rambler.ru/top100.cnt?519854 HTTP/1.1
Connection: close
Cookie: ruid=Osf9BTAXMkBuAgAAAc0h7bisv
Cookie2: $Version="1"
Host: counter.rambler.ru
Referer: http://www.handwatch.ru
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; Q312461)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:01 GMT
Content-type: image/gif
X-Cache: MISS from www.testproxy.net
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```

This is apparently an attempt to boost a site's ranking up on a top-100-sites list by creating a large number of hits from different locations (proxy servers).

f) Pay-per-click cheating

```
Request: 220.173.17.142 - - [Tue Mar 9 22:39:32 2004] "GET
http://media.imatchup.com/images/affiliates/getbanner.asp?affid=240&bannerid=8&account
id=90&websiteid=2 HTTP/1.1" 200 4127
Handler: proxy-server
-----
GET
http://media.imatchup.com/images/affiliates/getbanner.asp?affid=240&bannerid=8&account
id=90&websiteid=2 HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, application/vnd.ms-excel, */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en
Host: media.imatchup.com
Pragma: no-cache
Referer: http://www.sol23.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT)
X-Forwarded-For: 196.168.67.108
mod_security-message: Access denied with code 200. Pattern match "\.asp" at
THE_REQUEST.
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 20934
Content-Type: image/gif
Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDASRBTD RR=DPHKHLOCFDEAOPKNADHCNBDI; path=/
Cache-control: private
X-Cache: MISS from www.testproxy.net
```

This is apparently an attempt to cheat on a pay-per-click system.

g) Sending SPAM e-mail / SMS through web-based service

```
Request: 67.83.151.132 -- [Wed Mar 10 22:57:58 2004] "POST  
http://experiencethailand.netfirms.com/cgi-bin/formmail.pl HTTP/1.1" 200 578  
Handler: proxy-server  
Error: mod_security: Invalid character detected [13]  
-----  
POST http://experiencethailand.netfirms.com/cgi-bin/formmail.pl HTTP/1.1  
Accept: */*  
Connection: Close  
Content-Length: 413  
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded  
Host: experiencethailand.netfirms.com  
Proxy-Connection: Close  
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; AIRF; .NET CLR 1.0.3705)  
mod_security-action: 200  
  
email=thoraye8@exacom.net&realname=thoraye8@exacom.net&recipient=<madman1185@aol.com>  
experiencethailand.netfirms.com%2C&subject=7%3A56%3A42%20PM%20Hurry%20Up!+++++  
++59&el=%0D%0A%0D%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0D%0Alhk%0D%0A%0D%0Amadman1185%20Visit%2  
0http%3A%2F%2Fconnect.to%2Ffriendscams%20You%20wont%20regret%20it!%0D%0A%0A%0A%0A%0  
A%0D%0A7%3A56%3A42%20PM%0D%0A3%2F10%2F2004%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0A%0Ap3q  
  
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Connection: close  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

```
Request: 212.57.187.242 - - [Tue Mar 9 22:11:27 2004] "GET
https://www.chel.mts.ru/sms/cgi-bin/cgi_.exe?function=sms_send HTTP/1.1" 200 23501
Handler: proxy-server
-----
GET https://www.chel.mts.ru/sms/cgi-bin/cgi_.exe?function=sms_send HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.chel.mts.ru
Keep-Alive: 300
Referer: http://www.ya.ru/
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; MSIE 5.5; Windows NT 5.0) Opera 7.03
[en]

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-cookie: session_id=UNI_chl2_37c3726f76530a0fe;
Content-Type: text/html; charset=windows-1251
X-Cache: MISS from www.testproxy.net
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```

In the first instance the e-mail message content said it all – it was a SPAM mail. Also the same mail has been sent to multiple recipients. In the second instance, although the exact SMS message sent by the attacker was hidden by SSL encryption, it was highly likely to be SPAM since multiple similar instances have been observed throughout the audit log. The reason for using proxies is obvious – it makes tracing the perpetrator much harder. All the attacker needs is a open proxy and a web-based e-mail / SMS sending facility which do not have proper anti-SPAM procedures (like asking the user to input a number they see in a dynamically generated picture).

h) Sending SPAM e-mail through an SMTP server

```
Request: 200.46.208.17 - - [Thu Mar 11 17:21:59 2004] "CONNECT mx.freenet.de:25
HTTP/1.0" 200 0
Handler: proxy-server
-----
CONNECT mx.freenet.de:25 HTTP/1.0
HTTP/1.0 (null)
```

The exact connection content was not recorded in the log but again it was highly likely to be SPAM since 420 similar requests have been made within 6 seconds, as shown below:

```
mysql> select req, count(*) cnt, max(ts), min(ts) from access_log where
src=inet_aton('200.46.208.17') and req like 'CONNECT
mx.freenet.de%' group by src, req;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| req                                     | cnt | max(ts)                | min(ts)                |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| CONNECT mx.freenet.de:25 HTTP/1.0      | 420 | 2004-04-23 15:17:37    | 2004-04-23 15:17:32    |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (2.99 sec)
```

i) Vulnerability scanners

```
Request: 217.160.165.173 - - [Fri Mar 12 22:39:45 2004] "GET
/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/_vti_rpc HTTP/1.1" 404 307
Handler: (null)
Error: mod_security: Warning. Pattern match "/_vti_rpc" at THE_REQUEST.
-----
GET /_vti_bin/shtml.exe/_vti_rpc HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/png, */*
Accept-Charset: iso-8859-1,*,utf-8
Accept-Language: en
Connection: Close
Host: 192.168.1.103
Pragma: no-cache
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11, U; Nessus)
mod_security-message: Warning. Pattern match "/_vti_bin/" at THE_REQUEST.

HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

This is an exploit of the vulnerability listed in CVE candidate CAN-2000-0114 (<http://cgi.nessus.org/cve.php3?cve=CAN-2000-0114>). As can be seen from the User-Agent ID “User-Agent: Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11, U; Nessus)”, this is probably part of a vulnerability scan performed by Nessus. Many other attacks identified in the audit log came from Nessus scanners and they will not be described individually further on.

j) Code Red II

```
Request: 68.48.205.207 - - [Fri Mar 12 04:11:34 2004] "GET
/default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7
801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b0
0%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a HTTP/1.0" 200 566
Handler: (null)
Error: mod_security: Invalid URL encoding #2 detected.
-----
GET
/default.ida?XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7
801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b0
0%u531b%u53ff%u0078%u0000%u00=a HTTP/1.0
Content-length: 3379
Content-type: text/xml
mod_security-message: Invalid character detected
mod_security-action: 200

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

The above shows an attack by the worm Code Red II as described in CERT Incident Note IN-2001-09 (http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-09.html). This worm exploits a remote buffer overflow vulnerability in one of IIS's ISAPI extensions.

k) Nimda

```
Request: 68.48.142.117 - - [Tue Mar 9 22:33:55 2004] "GET
/_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 200
566
Handler: (null)
Error: mod_security: Warning. Pattern match "/_vti_bin/" at THE_REQUEST.
-----
GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
Connection: close
Host: www
mod_security-message: Access denied with code 200. Pattern match "cmd\\.exe" at
THE_REQUEST.
mod_security-action: 200

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

This is apparently a request made by a machine infected by the infamous Nimda worm, as described in CERT Advisory CA-2001-26 (<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-26.html>). The worm propagates by various means, one of which is exploiting a directory traversal vulnerability in IIS servers, as shown in the above request.

3. Do attackers target Secure Socket Layer (SSL) enabled web servers as their targets? Did they target SSL on our honeyproxy? Why would they want to use SSL? Why didn't they use SSL exclusively?

The attackers did attack SSL-enabled web servers, as can be seen from the large number of GET requests with HTTPS protocol. The honeyproxy itself's HTTPS port was also targeted, as can be seen in the *ssl_engine* file. Some possible reasons for the attackers' use of SSL are as follows:

- The target web server only supports HTTPS.

- The encryption of traffic makes it hard for Intrusion Detection Systems to identify attacks carried through HTTPS.
- The attacker might be using their real credentials to connect to a target and did not want them logged by the proxy server.
- There are certain vulnerabilities associated with the use of SSL on some web servers.

The reason why they did not use SSL exclusively was probably because of the high overhead in SSL handshaking. It would take much more time for automatic attacks over a large range of hosts.

4. Are there any indications of attackers chaining through other proxy servers? Describe how you identified this activity. List the other proxy servers identified. Can you confirm that these are indeed proxy servers?

Yes many attackers seemed to have connected through a proxy server to the honeypoxy. One clue is given by the “X-Forwarded-For” HTTP header which is created by Squid, a popular open source proxy server. The header is used to provide the server with the client's IP address, possibly for access control purpose (<http://freebsd.ntu.edu.tw/squid/FAQ/FAQ-4.html#ss4.15>). One such instance is shown below:

```
Request: 220.173.17.142 - - [Tue Mar 9 22:38:58 2004] "GET
http://www.kanoodle.com/clickthrough.cool?eid=1&clickid=12486486&id=70509698&lid=bhnnb
ingbknlbongbmnpbkmbonpbmno&query=automobiles HTTP/1.1" 301 363
Handler: proxy-server
-----
GET
http://www.kanoodle.com/clickthrough.cool?eid=1&clickid=12486486&id=70509698&lid=bhnnb
ingbknlbongbmnpbkmbonpbmno&query=automobiles HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/x-xbitmap, image/pjpeg, application/msword, */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en-us
Host: www.kanoodle.com
Pragma: no-cache
Referer: http://www.clickcheaper.com/search.php
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)
X-Forwarded-For: 207.69.122.153

HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
Set-cookie:
guru=1078890680:192.168.1.103:nobody:none:8878ecc40e35f937:e2dd409b7d8b0730b7d8756e63e
21806; domain=.kanoodle.com; path=/
Location: http://www.carsdirect.com/home?partner=kano&customerid=agx~automobiles
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
X-Cache: MISS from www.testproxy.net
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
```

To extract the list of such proxy-client mappings from the audit log, an *awk* script was written, of which the source code can be found in Appendix C and the result in Appendix D. It is possible to verify the proxy servers by using a proxy scanner on the suspected proxy IP addresses. However this was not carried out since this constitutes a port scan, which might have legal implications. Even if such a scan was carried out, it might not be a solid (counter-)proof since the IP owner could have changed, the proxy server might have been taken offline or it might have restricted access to certain clients.

5. Identify the different Brute Force Authentication attack methods. Can you obtain the clear text username/password credentials? Describe your methods.

- Attack on HTTP Basic Authentication Header

```
Request: 12.221.212.151 - - [Wed Mar 10 02:52:27 2004] "HEAD
http://www.sapphicerotica.com/members/index.html HTTP/1.0" 200 0
Handler: proxy-server
Error: mod_security: pausing [http://www.sapphicerotica.com/members/index.html] for
50000 ms
-----
HEAD http://www.sapphicerotica.com/members/index.html HTTP/1.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Authorization: Basic YnJvaWRvOmJpcjVkdU0=
Cookie: Apache=12779941078904977927; path=/Apache=12779941078904977927; path=/;
Host: www.sapphicerotica.com
Pragma: no-cache
Referer: http://www.sapphicerotica.com/members/index.html
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 ( compatible; [dk]; Windows NT4.0; MSNIA )
mod_security-message: Access denied with code 200. Pattern match "Basic" at HEADER.
mod_security-action: 200

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
```

As can be seen from the above audit log entry, the attacker attempted to brute force the HTTP authentication of the target site. The credentials can be obtained by applying a BASE64 decoding on the string after “Authorization: Basic” which is, in this case, “broido:bir5duM”.

- Attack on HTTP GET authentication

This is carried out by trying different combinations of usernames and passwords with a GET request to various login servers at *yahoo.com*. To further investigate this attack, a database search was used to pick out the top attacker using this method:

```
mysql> select inet_ntoa(src), count(*) cnt from access_log where req like
'%yahoo.co%passwd=%' group by src having cnt > 100 order by cnt desc limit 1;
+-----+-----+
| inet_ntoa(src) | cnt |
+-----+-----+
| 68.74.66.170   | 2104 |
+-----+-----+
1 rows in set (10.98 sec)
```

Then the result is exported into a file and then processed with the following commands:

```
bash$ echo "select req from access_log where src=inet_aton('68.74.66.170')" | mysql
-u php -p -B sotm31 > 68.74.66.170
bash$ sed -e 's/^.*login=\\([^\&]*\\).*$/\\1/' 68.74.66.170 | sort | uniq > logins
bash$ sed -e 's/^.*passwd=\\([^\&]*\\).*$/\\1/' 68.74.66.170 | sort | uniq > passwds
```

The username and password lists were hence obtained. For brevity's sake, only the first 50 lines of each file are shown below:

logins

```
_00000
_123456
_15
_16_aphrodite
_1920s_
_200
_24
_27_27_
_2727_
_27sugar_
_49
_4hisglory_
5-g
_666
_69
_69
a
a_18
_alb2c3
a_a
aadct7
_abbie
_abc
_a_b_c_
aboutjenna
absolut_citr0n
absoluteangelone
a_buck_
abusedparnt
abyssal-dragon.geo
_accidentally
acf666
acid_freak_
acid_shadow_
action_a
adam_dick
adam g
a_dawg
_addicted
addict_jim
adidas_bitch
a__dodger
adso_of_melk
a_dylan
_ae
_aerosmith
afe420
against+all+odds
_aim
```

passwd

```
123adam
123amande
123craig
123danny
123david
123derek
123greg
123james
123jeff
123john
123johnny
123josh
123julie
123lisa
666
666666
69
6969
696969
adam1
ali
angell
ball
bike
cash
chevy
dad
daddy
derek1
dmx
dude
DuDe
faith
freedom
heart
heat
jeff1
jeremy
jimmy1
justice
lonely
lord
loser
lover
manda
mark1
marlin
massacre
master
merlin
```

6. What does the Mod_Security error message "Invalid Character Detected" mean? What were the attackers trying to accomplish?

According to the source code of *mod_security.c*, the error message means a character in the URI is out of the allowable ASCII code range and the number in the square brackets following the message indicates the offending ASCII code.

One cause of such an error was that the attacker was trying to launch a buffer overflow attack against a server and since binary shell codes usually consist of non-readable characters, this invalid character error was reported.

Another scenario where such an error was reported was that non-English (such as Chinese or Japanese) characters were used in a GET request, possibly due to the presence of such characters in some of the submitted values.

7. Several attackers tried to send SPAM by accessing the following URL - <http://mail.sina.com.cn/cgi-bin/sendmsg.cgi>. They tried to send email with an html attachment (files listed in the /upload directory). What does the SPAM webpage say? Who are the SPAM recipients?

All the SPAM webpages have the same content. It is about Falun Gong, an organization/religion which has been banned in China. The webpage is apparently produced by a Falun Gong supporter and it explicitly accuses the former Chinese Government leader Jiang Zemin of political persecution against Falun Gong supporters. It also appeals to the reader to report about such persecutions to an organization called World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG).

The SPAM recipients can be identified in the audit log in the *to* and *cc* fields of the POST request to <http://mail.sina.com.cn/cgi-bin/sendmsg.cgi>. The listing of all recipients can be found in Appendix E. It was observed that all *to* addresses end in “@163.com” while the *cc* addresses “@sina.com”.

8. Provide some high level statistics on attackers

- Top 10 Attackers (extracted from Appendix A)

#	Hits	Files	Data size	Visits	Host	Country
1	9763	9763	5.38 Mb	3	67.83.151.132	United States
2	8346	1945	3.57 Mb	1	217.160.165.173	Germany
3	6865	6865	276.92 Kb	0	195.16.40.200	Russian Federation
4	5967	5836	3.20 Mb	15	68.82.168.149	United States
5	4290	1322	575.56 Kb	10	81.171.1.165	Netherlands
6	3245	2165	15.25 Mb	9	61.144.119.66	China
7	2984	2984	1.99 Kb	46	68.189.213.50	United States
8	2923	2923	3.81 Kb	8	61.249.170.159	Korea, Republic of
9	2907	58	1.49 Mb	2	61.177.91.33	China
10	2830	2170	10.28 Mb	7	217.162.108.28	Switzerland

- Top 10 Target URLs (extracted from Appendix A)

#	Hits	URL
1	10928	login.icq.com:443
2	4897	http://www.firmhandspanking.com/members/
3	1550	http://www.sun.com/
4	1280	http://hpcgi1.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi
5	1010	http://www.cnpick.com/show.asp
6	955	/scripts/..
7	927	http://www.google.com/search
8	833	http://members.streetblowjobs.com/
9	830	http://www.easynews.com/login/
10	821	http://www.meninpain.com/members/

- Top 10 User-Agents (extracted from Appendix A)

#	Hits	Percentage	User Agent
1	11360	5.62%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
2	9759	4.83%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; AIRF; .NET CLR
3	8339	4.13%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)
4	7994	3.95%	Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11, U; Nessus)
5	7413	3.67%	Mozilla/3.0 (compatible)
6	7375	3.65%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)
7	6118	3.03%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1
8	4013	1.99%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.02; Windows 98)
9	3925	1.94%	Mozilla/4.73 [en] (Win98; U)
10	3129	1.55%	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; ICS)

- Some funny User Agents

```
• 195.25.76.75 - - [12/Mar/2004:07:59:10 -0500] "GET http://www.google.fr/ HTTP/1.0"
  200 3165 "-" "2.0_AC-Plug - http://www.iOpus.com"
• 80.202.48.83 - - [10/Mar/2004:10:25:19 -0500] "GET
  http://mlocate.spotlife.net/locate.sxml HTTP/1.0" 200 607 "-" "Logitech Video IM
  Companion"
• 131.246.236.206 - - [13/Mar/2004:15:07:39 -0500] "GET
  http://131.246.236.206/%7Epschmitt/page.html HTTP/1.0" 200 300 "-" "unfiltered"
• 62.167.204.40 - - [12/Mar/2004:07:26:33 -0500] "GET
  http://www.lecabinet.com/images/sm_carre.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 76
  "http://www.lecabinet.com/motel/2003_06_18.html" "You lose !"
• 218.72.187.60 - - [13/Mar/2004:12:31:52 -0500] "GET http://thesearcherz.com/cgi-
  bin/smartsearch.cgi?username=searcho&keywords=jewelry HTTP/1.0" 200 604
  "http://www.searchoio.com/" "unknown"
```

```
• 167.83.9.20 - - [12/Mar/2004:06:32:24 -0500] "GET
http://s.abetterinternet.com/bi/servlet/BIMaster?adcontext=http://pagead2.googlesyn
dication.com/pagead/ads?client%3Dca-pub-
029467367xxxxxxx%26random%3D1079090853697%26lmt%3D1079090853%26format%3D728x90_as%2
6output%3Dhtml%26url%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww.aliveproxy.com%2Ffastest-
proxies%2F%26color_bg%3Df1f1f1%26color_text%3Df1f1f1%26color_link%3D0000FF%26color_
url%3D0000FF%26color_border%3Df1f1f1&contextpeak=12454&contextcount=12453&countryco
dein=US&lastAdTime=1079090236|1075199379|1078587241|1078494337|1078898379|0|0|0|0|&
lastAdCode=1&cookie1=capdate%3D126%26capdatedy%3D0312%26lupgtry%3D1%26lupgid%3D128%
26lupgdt%3D1072246237350%26lflshdt%3D1069233670%26lstkywd%3Daspen%26lstlogdt%3D2004
0312%26cntp%3D%26capcnt%3D2%26capcntdy%3D3%26&cookie2=lastlstdt%3D1078486107931%26f
stcidt%3D1069233670896%26&InstID={B543282B-5BEA-4DFC-B52D-
2466184D61FF}&DistID=MSI29112&status=1&smode=7&bho=bi.dll&NumWindows=2 HTTP/1.0"
200 1147 "-" "{B543282B-5BEA-4DFC-B52D-2466184D61FF}|0.0.4.19"
```

Among the above funny user agents, “You lose !” was obviously fake. So was “unknown”, since it would be strange that the user agent did not know its own name.

9. Why do you think the attackers were targeting pornography websites for brute force attacks? (Besides the obvious physical gratification scenarios :)

Possible reasons are as follows:

- The attacker might be able to get hold of credit card information of the account owner in a successful attack since pornography websites users are likely to use credit card for membership fee payment.
- Victims are less likely to report to the police or stand up in court against the attacker in fear of embarrassment.
- Members might use simpler passwords in pornography websites since they are likely to have registered on the spur of the moment or simply because the websites are of less importance to them.
- The websites themselves might itself be illegal so it is unlikely that any legal action would be taken against the attacker should the attack be identified.

C. Appendix

A) Usage report generated by Webalizer + GeoIP library

Summary Period: March 2004


Generated 22-Apr-2004 17:06 BST

GEO-106FREE 20040401 Build 1 Copyright (c) 2004 [MaxMind](#) LLC All Rights Reserved

[\[Daily Statistics\]](#) [\[Hourly Statistics\]](#) [\[URLs\]](#) [\[Entry\]](#) [\[Exit\]](#) [\[Sites\]](#) [\[Referrers\]](#) [\[Search\]](#) [\[Agents\]](#) [\[Countries\]](#)


Monthly Statistics for March 2004		
Total Hits	202126	
Total Files	153844	
Total Pages	100629	
Total Visits	7362	
Total KBytes	819.17 Mb	
Total Unique Sites	3897	
Total Unique URLs	24500	
Total Unique Referrers	12648	
Total Unique User Agents	4525	
	Avg	Max
Hits per Hour	1403	10299
Hits per Day	33687	80522
Files per Day	25640	58982
Pages per Day	16771	42553
Visits per Day	1227	3156
KBytes per Day	136.53 Mb	522.15 Mb
Hits by Response Code		
Undefined response code	167	
Code 200 - OK	153844	
Code 204 - No Content	6	
Code 206 - Partial Content	461	
Code 301 - Moved Permanently	404	
Code 302 - Found	19213	
Code 303 - See Other	2	

Code 304 - Not Modified	4121
Code 400 - Bad Request	2311
Code 401 - Unauthorized	1107
Code 403 - Forbidden	4617
Code 404 - Not Found	6365
Code 405 - Method Not Allowed	6
Code 406 - Not Acceptable	2
Code 408 - Request Timeout	7
Code 410 - Gone	29
Code 411 - Length Required	10
Code 414 - Request-URI Too Long	7
Code 416 - Requested Range Not Satisfiable	12
Code 500 - Internal Server Error	3522
Code 501 - Not Implemented	478
Code 502 - Bad Gateway	4338
Code 503 - Service Unavailable	1097



Daily Statistics for March 2004						
Day	Hits	Files	Pages	Visits	Sites	KBytes

9	578	0.29%	435	0.28%	204	0.20%	41	0.56%	50	1.28%	1.42 Mb	0.17%
10	24807	12.27%	22140	14.39%	7238	7.19%	618	8.39%	378	9.70%	43.53 Mb	5.31%
11	33217	16.43%	26818	17.43%	12049	11.97%	988	13.42%	606	15.55%	55.11 Mb	6.73%
12	39733	19.66%	25010	16.26%	23795	23.65%	1557	21.15%	1061	27.23%	75.85 Mb	9.26%
13	80522	39.84%	58982	38.34%	42553	42.29%	3156	42.87%	2024	51.94%	522.15 Mb	63.74%
14	23269	11.51%	20459	13.30%	14790	14.70%	1136	15.43%	919	23.58%	121.11 Mb	14.78%



Hourly Statistics for March 2004												
Hour	Hits			Files			Pages			KBytes		
	Avg	Total		Avg	Total		Avg	Total		Avg	Total	
0	1821	10927	5.41%	1298	7792	5.06%	752	4513	4.48%	7.50 Mb	45.01 Mb	5.50%
1	1626	9758	4.83%	1294	7769	5.05%	771	4628	4.60%	10.81 Mb	64.85 Mb	7.92%
2	1199	7194	3.56%	1007	6046	3.93%	678	4071	4.05%	5.56 Mb	33.38 Mb	4.07%
3	1377	8265	4.09%	1164	6984	4.54%	764	4587	4.56%	18.08 Mb	108.47 Mb	13.24%
4	1091	6549	3.24%	908	5452	3.54%	576	3456	3.43%	5.35 Mb	32.10 Mb	3.92%
5	829	4975	2.46%	685	4113	2.67%	408	2450	2.43%	3.64 Mb	21.85 Mb	2.67%
6	813	4882	2.42%	659	3957	2.57%	407	2447	2.43%	12.59 Mb	75.52 Mb	9.22%
7	1070	6420	3.18%	842	5054	3.29%	567	3403	3.38%	3.63 Mb	21.81 Mb	2.66%
8	1514	9087	4.50%	1166	6996	4.55%	811	4869	4.84%	4.78 Mb	28.66 Mb	3.50%
9	2256	13541	6.70%	1534	9206	5.98%	1194	7166	7.12%	6.22 Mb	37.32 Mb	4.56%
10	2113	12681	6.27%	1620	9725	6.32%	1007	6043	6.01%	13.97 Mb	83.85 Mb	10.24%

11	1322	7937	3.9 3%	1063	6381	4.1 5%	791	4749	4.7 2%	3.73 Mb	22.38 Mb	2.73 %
12	1324	7944	3.9 3%	1104	6629	4.3 1%	665	3991	3.9 7%	2.49 Mb	14.94 Mb	1.82 %
13	1210	7263	3.5 9%	983	5900	3.8 4%	625	3753	3.7 3%	2.25 Mb	13.52 Mb	1.65 %
14	1238	7432	3.6 8%	988	5933	3.8 6%	626	3758	3.7 3%	2.41 Mb	14.47 Mb	1.77 %
15	1296	7778	3.8 5%	970	5821	3.7 8%	629	3779	3.7 6%	2.47 Mb	14.79 Mb	1.81 %
16	1489	8937	4.4 2%	1238	7430	4.8 3%	529	3175	3.1 6%	4.73 Mb	28.38 Mb	3.46 %
17	1392	8352	4.1 3%	1063	6380	4.1 5%	556	3336	3.3 2%	4.55 Mb	27.30 Mb	3.33 %
18	1211	7269	3.6 0%	960	5764	3.7 5%	526	3160	3.1 4%	3.17 Mb	19.02 Mb	2.32 %
19	1305	7830	3.8 7%	1057	6347	4.1 3%	557	3347	3.3 3%	2.80 Mb	16.77 Mb	2.05 %
20	1185	7110	3.5 2%	980	5885	3.8 3%	568	3408	3.3 9%	3.30 Mb	19.78 Mb	2.42 %
21	1035	6211	3.0 7%	808	4851	3.1 5%	549	3298	3.2 8%	4.48 Mb	26.90 Mb	3.28 %
22	2624	15745	7.7 9%	1296	7779	5.0 6%	1616	9699	9.6 4%	4.08 Mb	24.47 Mb	2.99 %
23	1339	8039	3.9 8%	941	5650	3.6 7%	590	3543	3.5 2%	3.94 Mb	23.63 Mb	2.88 %

Top 30 of 24500 Total URLs

#	Hits		KBytes		URL
1	10928	5.41 %	1.99 Mb	0.24 %	login.icq.com:443
2	4897	2.42 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	http://www.firmhandspanking.com/members/
3	1550	0.77 %	1.64 Mb	0.20 %	http://www.sun.com/
4	1280	0.63 %	2.54 Mb	0.31 %	http://hpcgi1.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi
5	1010	0.50 %	527.31 Kb	0.06 %	http://www.cnpick.com/show.asp
6	955	0.47 %	527.90 Kb	0.06 %	/scripts/..
7	927	0.46 %	15.18 Mb	1.85 %	http://www.google.com/search
8	833	0.41 %	3.32 Kb	0.00 %	http://members.streetblowjobs.com/
9	830	0.41 %	231.04 Kb	0.03 %	http://www.easynews.com/login/
10	821	0.41 %	566 bytes	0.00 %	http://www.meninpain.com/members/
11	820	0.41 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	http://www.realfuckingcouples.com/members/
12	817	0.40 %	2.21 Kb	0.00 %	http://www.busty-teens.org/members/main.htm
13	711	0.35 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	http://www.crookedpanties.com/members/

14	707	0.35 %	390.78 Kb	0.05 %	http://members.maturetouch.com/
15	704	0.35 %	389.12 Kb	0.05 %	http://www.1by-day.com/members/hardcore.htm
16	698	0.35 %	4.01 Mb	0.49 %	http://www.awin1.com/show.php
17	657	0.33 %	5.11 Mb	0.62 %	http://slashdot.org/comments.pl
18	645	0.32 %	971.91 Kb	0.12 %	http://members.pityfuck.com/(0/0/0)/
19	613	0.30 %	30.12 Kb	0.00 %	http://service.bfast.com/bfast/serve
20	577	0.29 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	http://members.monstersofcock.com/
21	575	0.28 %	7.68 Mb	0.94 %	http://www.wireimage.com/default.asp
22	553	0.27 %	305.66 Kb	0.04 %	http://edit.vip.tpe.yahoo.com/config/login
23	548	0.27 %	10.30 Mb	1.26 %	http://www.freehomepages.com/missing.php
24	534	0.26 %	3.89 Mb	0.47 %	http://www.outwar.com/page.php
25	517	0.26 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	http://www.captiveculture.com/members/
26	509	0.25 %	13.32 Mb	1.63 %	http://www.blazerunner.com/cgi-bin/smartsearch/smartsearch.cgi
27	472	0.23 %	0 bytes	0.00 %	200.221.11.50:25
28	470	0.23 %	13.27 Kb	0.00 %	http://www.ftvmembers.com/mt2941ct/updates.html
29	424	0.21 %	1.66 Kb	0.00 %	http://www.4cfnm.com/members/
30	413	0.20 %	228.28 Kb	0.03 %	http://edit.korea.yahoo.com/config/login

Top 10 of 24500 Total URLs By KBytes

#	Hits		KBytes		URL
1	10	0.00 %	72.64 Mb	8.87 %	http://www5.apolo-av.net/list/211/ap0402211-a.wmv
2	1	0.00 %	46.98 Mb	5.74 %	http://www1.ttcn.ne.jp/~non6/m026_03a/k/M026_03a.zip
3	10	0.00 %	15.40 Mb	1.88 %	http://66.117.40.60/indies285erorist.zip
4	927	0.46 %	15.18 Mb	1.85 %	http://www.google.com/search
5	509	0.25 %	13.32 Mb	1.63 %	http://www.blazerunner.com/cgi-bin/smartsearch/smartsearch.cgi
6	548	0.27 %	10.30 Mb	1.26 %	http://www.freehomepages.com/missing.php
7	1	0.00 %	9.28 Mb	1.13 %	http://www.mc.ccnw.ne.jp/it5114/block/ds_adachi_yumi_tanima.zip
8	1	0.00 %	8.25 Mb	1.01 %	http://61.211.226.199/ds_shiraishi_miho_sukebra.zip
9	220	0.11 %	7.84 Mb	0.96 %	http://www.blazerunner.com
10	575	0.28 %	7.68 Mb	0.94 %	http://www.wireimage.com/default.asp

Top 10 of 1781 Total Entry Pages					
#	Hits		Visits		URL
1	1550	0.77 %	950	14.20 %	http://www.sun.com/
2	1280	0.63 %	500	7.47 %	http://hpcgi1.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi
3	222	0.11 %	142	2.12 %	http://www.glocksoft.net/cgi-bin/jenv.cgi
4	263	0.13 %	137	2.05 %	http://www.samair.ru/proxy/proxychecker/results.htm
5	156	0.08 %	115	1.72 %	http://www.google.com/
6	534	0.26 %	103	1.54 %	http://www.outwar.com/page.php
7	698	0.35 %	99	1.48 %	http://www.awin1.com/show.php
8	213	0.11 %	98	1.46 %	/
9	125	0.06 %	84	1.26 %	http://www.yahoo.com/
10	509	0.25 %	64	0.96 %	http://www.blazerunner.com/cgi-bin/smartsearch/smartsearch.cgi

Top 10 of 2344 Total Exit Pages					
#	Hits		Visits		URL
1	1280	0.63 %	382	5.83 %	http://hpcgi1.nifty.com/trino/ProxyJ/prxjdg.cgi
2	1550	0.77 %	314	4.79 %	http://www.sun.com/
3	213	0.11 %	150	2.29 %	/
4	222	0.11 %	131	2.00 %	http://www.glocksoft.net/cgi-bin/jenv.cgi
5	263	0.13 %	121	1.85 %	http://www.samair.ru/proxy/proxychecker/results.htm
6	534	0.26 %	104	1.59 %	http://www.outwar.com/page.php
7	698	0.35 %	99	1.51 %	http://www.awin1.com/show.php
8	156	0.08 %	98	1.50 %	http://www.google.com/
9	125	0.06 %	68	1.04 %	http://www.yahoo.com/
10	68	0.03 %	67	1.02 %	http://www.taruo.net:80/e/

Top 30 of 3897 Total Sites						
#	Hits	Files	KBytes	Visits	Hostname	Country

1	9763	4.83%	9763	6.35%	5.38 Mb	0.66%	3	0.04%	67.83.151.132	United States
2	8346	4.13%	1945	1.26%	3.57 Mb	0.44%	1	0.01%	217.160.165.173	Germany
3	6865	3.40%	6865	4.46%	276.92 Kb	0.03%	0	0.00%	195.16.40.200	Russian Federation
4	5967	2.95%	5836	3.79%	3.20 Mb	0.39%	15	0.20%	68.82.168.149	United States
5	4290	2.12%	1322	0.86%	575.56 Kb	0.07%	10	0.14%	81.171.1.165	Netherlands
6	3245	1.61%	2165	1.41%	15.25 Mb	1.86%	9	0.12%	61.144.119.66	China
7	2984	1.48%	2984	1.94%	1.99 Kb	0.00%	46	0.62%	68.189.213.50	United States
8	2923	1.45%	2923	1.90%	3.81 Kb	0.00%	8	0.11%	61.249.170.159	Korea, Republic of
9	2907	1.44%	58	0.04%	1.49 Mb	0.18%	2	0.03%	61.177.91.33	China
10	2830	1.40%	2170	1.41%	10.28 Mb	1.25%	7	0.10%	217.162.108.28	Switzerland
11	2399	1.19%	2397	1.56%	8.26 Kb	0.00%	2	0.03%	61.249.170.254	Korea, Republic of
12	2304	1.14%	1875	1.22%	172.15 Kb	0.02%	2	0.03%	69.41.243.42	United States
13	2264	1.12%	2025	1.32%	1.16 Mb	0.14%	0	0.00%	68.48.142.117	United States
14	2214	1.10%	1462	0.95%	1.45 Mb	0.18%	9	0.12%	24.127.175.68	United States
15	2181	1.08%	2053	1.33%	22.36 Mb	2.73%	1	0.01%	222.2.255.231	Japan
16	2104	1.04%	2092	1.36%	1.13 Mb	0.14%	0	0.00%	68.74.66.170	United States
17	1946	0.96%	799	0.52%	53.77 Mb	6.56%	1	0.01%	212.160.181.12	Poland
18	1923	0.95%	985	0.64%	4.52 Mb	0.55%	1	0.01%	165.76.203.232	Japan
19	1847	0.91%	1224	0.80%	26.25 Mb	3.20%	2	0.03%	69.93.129.98	United States
20	1812	0.90%	1150	0.75%	23.09 Mb	2.82%	2	0.03%	69.93.162.10	United States
21	1758	0.87%	942	0.61%	20.35 Mb	2.48%	3	0.04%	218.22.141.172	China
22	1727	0.85%	1235	0.80%	173.83 Kb	0.02%	0	0.00%	69.27.32.98	United States
23	1559	0.77%	732	0.48%	22.29 Mb	2.72%	29	0.39%	66.230.236.14	United States
24	1486	0.74%	1278	0.83%	88.12 Kb	0.01%	0	0.00%	80.86.103.44	Romania
25	1415	0.70%	719	0.47%	8.06 Mb	0.98%	28	0.38%	61.237.215.17	China
26	1408	0.70%	655	0.43%	11.56 Mb	1.41%	14	0.19%	212.160.136.163	Poland
27	1387	0.69%	1243	0.81%	727.69 Kb	0.09%	0	0.00%	68.48.7.157	United States
28	1381	0.68%	1089	0.71%	124.86 Kb	0.01%	1	0.01%	200.46.208.17	Panama
29	1353	0.67%	909	0.59%	18.78 Mb	2.29%	1	0.01%	69.56.230.182	United States
30	1337	0.66%	1226	0.80%	14.36 Mb	1.75%	4	0.05%	220.55.136.44	Japan

Top 10 of 3897 Total Sites By KBytes										
#	Hits		Files		KBytes		Visits		Hostname	Country
1	1946	0.96%	799	0.52%	53.77 Mb	6.56%	1	0.01%	212.160.181.12	Poland
2	19	0.01%	4	0.00%	49.80 Mb	6.08%	0	0.00%	220.98.90.251	Japan
3	1	0.00%	1	0.00%	46.98 Mb	5.74%	0	0.00%	219.108.5.2	Japan
4	79	0.04%	79	0.05%	42.91 Mb	5.24%	1	0.01%	220.111.69.77	Japan
5	286	0.14%	182	0.12%	36.85 Mb	4.50%	2	0.03%	220.111.69.170	Japan
6	1847	0.91%	1224	0.80%	26.25 Mb	3.20%	2	0.03%	69.93.129.98	United States
7	1812	0.90%	1150	0.75%	23.09 Mb	2.82%	2	0.03%	69.93.162.10	United States
8	6	0.00%	6	0.00%	22.84 Mb	2.79%	0	0.00%	220.111.245.43	Japan
9	2181	1.08%	2053	1.33%	22.36 Mb	2.73%	1	0.01%	222.2.255.231	Japan
10	1559	0.77%	732	0.48%	22.29 Mb	2.72%	29	0.39%	66.230.236.14	United States


Top 30 of 12648 Total Referrers			
#	Hits		Referrer
1	90639	44.84%	- (Direct Request)
2	3859	1.91%	http://www.china0519.com/
3	2971	1.47%	http://www.gamespot.com/gamespot/misc/complete/login.html
4	1286	0.64%	http://members.pityfuck.com/
5	990	0.49%	http://www.freehomepages.com/gzyten/gzyten1.html
6	901	0.45%	http://www.freehomepages.com/gzyten/gzyten4.html
7	877	0.43%	http://www.blazerunner.com/cgi-bin/smartsearch/smartsearch.cgi
8	817	0.40%	http://www.busty-teens.org/members/main.htm
9	802	0.40%	http://www.pakalolo.net/pvrank/html/index.html
10	707	0.35%	http://members.maturetouch.com/
11	598	0.30%	http://www.1by-day.com/members/hardcore.htm
12	583	0.29%	http://www.linkou.con.cn
13	583	0.29%	http://www.wireimage.com/default.asp

14	570	0.28 %	http://porntreasure.vipxhost.com/
15	570	0.28 %	http://thesearcherz.com/cgi-bin/smartsearch.cgi
16	557	0.28 %	http://wetholes.extreme-pics.net/
17	541	0.27 %	http://www.crookedpanties.com:80
18	504	0.25 %	http://www.gravity-search.net/cgi-bin/smartsearch.cgi
19	461	0.23 %	http://www.freehomepages.com/gzyten/gzyten.html
20	455	0.23 %	http://www.freehomepages.com/gzyten/gzyten2.html
21	448	0.22 %	http://www.easynews.com/login/index.phtml
22	418	0.21 %	http://www.pay-per-click.ws/s.php
23	416	0.21 %	http://members.monstersofcock.com/
24	414	0.20 %	http://www.pv-studio.com/pv-shop/
25	378	0.19 %	http://www.xxx-folders.com/
26	359	0.18 %	http://www.4cfnm.com/members/index.htm
27	354	0.18 %	http://sexhorizon.vipxhost.com/
28	353	0.17 %	http://www.easynews.com/
29	345	0.17 %	http://members.asianheat.com/index.shtml
30	339	0.17 %	http://www.allsportssearch.net/search.php

Top 4 of 4 Total Search Strings			
#	Hits		Search String
1	11	68.75%	style xp 2.01 crack
2	2	12.50%	eritrea
3	2	12.50%	www
4	1	6.25%	opera

Top 15 of 4525 Total User Agents			
#	Hits		User Agent
1	11360	5.62 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1)
2	9759	4.83 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98; AIRF; .NET CLR
3	8339	4.13 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)

4	7994	3.95 %	Mozilla/4.75 [en] (X11, U; Nessus)
5	7413	3.67 %	Mozilla/3.0 (compatible)
6	7375	3.65 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.0)
7	6118	3.03 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; .NET CLR 1
8	4013	1.99 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.02; Windows 98)
9	3925	1.94 %	Mozilla/4.73 [en] (Win98; U)
10	3129	1.55 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; ICS)
11	2440	1.21 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.01; Windows NT 5.0)
12	2194	1.09 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.23; Mac_PowerPC)
13	1679	0.83 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows 98)
14	1598	0.79 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; Windows 98)
15	1266	0.63 %	Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 95)



Top 30 of 80 Total Countries							
#	Hits		Files		KBytes		Country
1	59984	29.68 %	52671	34.24 %	134.13 Mb	16.37 %	United States
2	32785	16.22 %	20315	13.20 %	168.78 Mb	20.60 %	China
3	25113	12.42 %	18030	11.72 %	10.14 Mb	1.24 %	Germany
4	17743	8.78 %	9231	6.00 %	344.12 Mb	42.01 %	Japan
5	9686	4.79 %	9057	5.89 %	11.23 Mb	1.37 %	Russian Federation

6	5920	2.93 %	2699	1.75 %	2.88 Mb	0.35 %	Netherlands
7	5847	2.89 %	5718	3.72 %	585.15 Kb	0.07 %	Korea (South)
8	4592	2.27 %	2408	1.57 %	65.91 Mb	8.05 %	Poland
9	4277	2.12 %	3025	1.97 %	10.21 Mb	1.25 %	Taiwan
10	3684	1.82 %	3234	2.10 %	3.81 Mb	0.47 %	Canada
11	3408	1.69 %	3397	2.21 %	1.09 Mb	0.13 %	Israel
12	3328	1.65 %	2656	1.73 %	10.43 Mb	1.27 %	Switzerland
13	2013	1.00 %	1655	1.08 %	1.30 Mb	0.16 %	Sweden
14	1950	0.96 %	1648	1.07 %	1.03 Mb	0.13 %	Romania
15	1836	0.91 %	1827	1.19 %	81.67 Kb	0.01 %	Spain
16	1787	0.88 %	1451	0.94 %	8.28 Mb	1.01 %	Australia
17	1715	0.85 %	1581	1.03 %	988.77 Kb	0.12 %	France
18	1607	0.80 %	1517	0.99 %	973.51 Kb	0.12 %	Turkey
19	1403	0.69 %	1258	0.82 %	6.78 Mb	0.83 %	Great Britain (UK)
20	1381	0.68 %	1089	0.71 %	124.86 Kb	0.01 %	Panama
21	904	0.45 %	588	0.38 %	169.66 Kb	0.02 %	Thailand
22	849	0.42 %	705	0.46 %	2.09 Mb	0.26 %	Uruguay
23	772	0.38 %	406	0.26 %	6.79 Mb	0.83 %	Indonesia
24	747	0.37 %	725	0.47 %	5.51 Mb	0.67 %	Norway
25	696	0.34 %	673	0.44 %	132.12 Kb	0.02 %	Brazil
26	676	0.33 %	652	0.42 %	336.13 Kb	0.04 %	Austria
27	656	0.32 %	571	0.37 %	900.89 Kb	0.11 %	Malaysia
28	642	0.32 %	500	0.33 %	556.69 Kb	0.07 %	Ukraine
29	630	0.31 %	574	0.37 %	384.24 Kb	0.05 %	Italy
30	626	0.31 %	625	0.41 %	332.27 Kb	0.04 %	Estonia

B) Source code: *clf2mysql.c*

```
/*
 * clf2mysql.c
 *
 * Utility to parse Common Log Format file and insert content into database
 *
 * Copyright 2004 Ken Lee (ahken@ahken.net)
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <mysql.h>

#define MAX_LINE_SZ          8191
#define MAX_SRC_SZ           255
#define MAX_IDENT_SZ         1
#define MAX_AUTHUSER_SZ      127
#define MAX_TS_SZ            127
#define MAX_REQ_SZ           4095
#define MAX_REFERERER_SZ     3071
#define MAX_BROWSER_ID_SZ    255
#define TABLE_NAME          "access_log"

#define min(x, y)             (x < y ? x : y)

char *parse_quoted_string(const char *str, char openq, char closeq, char *result, int
max_size)
{
    char *start, *end;
    int len;

    if (openq == '\\0') {
        start = str - 1;
    }
    else {
        if (!(start = strchr(str, openq))) {
            return NULL;
        }
        if (!(end = strchr(start + 1, closeq))) {
            return NULL;
        }
        len = min(end - start - 1, max_size);
        strncpy(result, start + 1, len);
        result[len] = '\\0';

        return end + 1;
    }
}

char *generate_insert_sql(const char *src, const char *authuser, const char *ts, const
char *req, int status,
                        const char *referrer, const char *browser_id)
{
    static char buffer[MAX_LINE_SZ + 256];

    snprintf(buffer, MAX_LINE_SZ + 255,
             "INSERT INTO %s VALUES (NULL, INET_ATON(\"%s\"), \"%s\",
STR_TO_DATE(\"%s\", '%d/%b/%Y:%T'), \"%s\", %d, \"%s\", \"%s\")",
             TABLE_NAME, src, authuser, ts, req, status, referrer, browser_id);

    return buffer;
}

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    FILE *log_file;
    MYSQL *db_conn;
    char line[MAX_LINE_SZ + 1];
```

```
char src[MAX_SRC_SZ + 1];
char ident[MAX_IDENT_SZ + 1];
char authuser[MAX_AUTHUSER_SZ + 1];
char ts[MAX_TS_SZ + 1];
char req[MAX_REQ_SZ + 1];
unsigned status;
unsigned bytes;
char referrer[MAX_REFERRER_SZ + 1];
char browser_id[MAX_BROWSER_ID_SZ + 1];

char *curr = NULL;

/* Check param */
if (argc < 6) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <CLF file> <DB host> <DB user> <DB password> <DB name>\n", argv[0]);
    exit(1);
}

/* Open log file */
if (!(log_file = fopen(argv[1], "r"))) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error opening log file\n");
    exit(2);
}

/* Connect to database */
if (!(db_conn = mysql_init(NULL)) || !mysql_real_connect(db_conn, argv[2], argv[3], argv[4], argv[5], 0, NULL, 0)) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to database\n");
    exit(2);
}

/* Read each line in log file */
while (fgets(line, MAX_LINE_SZ + 1, log_file)) {
    curr = line;

    /* Source */
    if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, '\\0', ' ', src, MAX_SRC_SZ))) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at SOURCE:\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
        continue;
    }

    /* Ident */
    if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, '\\0', ' ', ident, MAX_IDENT_SZ))) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at IDENT:\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
        continue;
    }

    /* Authuser */
    if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, '\\0', ' ', authuser, MAX_AUTHUSER_SZ))) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at AUTHUSER:\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
        continue;
    }

    /* Timestamp */
    if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, '[', ']', ts, MAX_TS_SZ))) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at TIMESTAMP:\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
        continue;
    }

    /* Request */
    if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, '"', '"', req, MAX_REQ_SZ))) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at REQUEST:\n");
        fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
        continue;
    }
}
```

```
/* Parse status and bytes with sscanf */
if (sscanf(curr, "%d %d", &status, &bytes) < 1) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at STATUS:\n");
    fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
    continue;
}

/* Referrer */
if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, "'", "'", referrer, MAX_REFERRER_SZ))) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at REFERRER:\n");
    fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
    continue;
}

/* Browser ID */
if (!(curr = parse_quoted_string(curr, "'", "'", browser_id, MAX_BROWSER_ID_SZ))) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Parse error at BROWSER ID:\n");
    fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
    continue;
}

/* Generate SQL query */
if (mysql_query(db_conn, generate_insert_sql(src, authuser, ts, req, status,
referrer, browser_id))) {
    fprintf(stderr, "Error creating query:\n");
    fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", line);
    continue;
}
}

/* Disconnect from database */
mysql_close(db_conn);

/* Close log file */
fclose(log_file);

return 0;
}
```

C) Source code: *extract_proxy_mappings.awk*

```
#!/usr/bin/gawk

# States:
# 0 = Idle
# 1 = Delimiter (^=+$) seen
# 2 = Request seen
# 3 = X-Forwarded-For seen
BEGIN {
    state = 0;
}

/^=+$/ {
    if (state != 0) {
        print "Error at line " NR > "/dev/stderr";
        next;
    }
    state = 1;
    req = "";
}

/^Request:/ {
    if (state != 1) {
        print "Error at line " NR > "/dev/stderr";
        next;
    }
    state = 2;
    req = $2;
}
```

```
/^X-Forwarded-For:/ {
    if (state != 2) {
        print "Error at line " NR > "/dev/stderr";
        next;
    }
    state = 3;
    print req " FORWARDS_FOR " $2;
}

/^$/ {
    state = 0;
}
```

D) Suspected proxies

137.118.192.151	137-118-192-151.du.pinetel.com.
137.118.192.152	137-118-192-152.du.pinetel.com.
140.116.142.32	
140.116.163.201	
140.131.1.42	
145.254.70.34	dialin-145-254-070-034.arcor-ip.net.
172.143.200.64	
172.208.22.44	acd0162c.ipt.aol.com.
172.209.201.200	acd1c9c8.ipt.aol.com.
195.174.194.54	abn194-54.izmir-ports.kablonet.net.tr.
195.5.58.1	
195.82.27.11	dial-195-82-27-11.gw4.ala2.nursat.net.
195.82.27.23	dial-195-82-27-23.gw4.ala2.nursat.net.
195.82.27.46	dial-195-82-27-46.gw4.ala2.nursat.net.
195.82.31.113	dial-195-82-31-113.gw6.ala2.nursat.net.
195.82.31.67	dial-195-82-31-67.gw6.ala2.nursat.net.
202.101.150.100	
202.109.116.209	
202.147.99.36	pr-99-036.ains.net.au.
203.189.246.142	
203.43.237.3	c3.237.43.203.satellite.bigpond.com.
210.21.209.251	
210.53.201.151	
210.53.201.152	
210.53.201.153	
210.53.201.154	
210.53.201.155	
210.53.201.156	
210.53.201.157	
210.53.201.158	
210.53.201.159	
210.53.201.160	
210.53.201.161	
210.53.201.162	
210.53.201.163	
210.53.201.164	
210.53.201.165	
210.77.109.112	
211.158.126.117	
211.161.36.130	
211.197.165.67	
211.197.165.68	
211.39.141.103	
212.160.136.163	2.eia.\212\160\136\163.
213.54.181.132	p213.54.181.132.tisdip.tiscali.de.
213.54.63.229	p213.54.63.229.tisdip.tiscali.de.
213.59.170.195	fivt.krgtu.ru.
216.127.74.127	
217.228.214.79	pd9e4d64f.dip.t-dialin.net.
217.228.216.89	pd9e4d859.dip.t-dialin.net.
217.235.115.253	pd9eb73fd.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.
217.235.11.73	
217.235.12.154	pd9eb0c9a.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.
217.235.7.100	pd9eb0764.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.

217.235.8.109	pd9eb086d.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.
217.235.8.159	pd9eb089f.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.
217.235.9.108	pd9eb096c.dip0.t-ipconnect.de.
217.85.103.217	pd95567d9.dip.t-dialin.net.
217.96.185.129	pf129.zgora.sdi.tpnet.pl.
218.0.16.234	
218.10.151.196	
218.10.185.136	
218.10.185.204	
218.10.185.205	
218.10.185.7	
218.10.40.18	
218.10.74.151	
218.10.74.177	
218.11.112.192	
218.11.13.35	
218.11.157.1	
218.11.157.46	
218.21.81.147	
218.21.81.162	
218.21.83.16	
218.21.86.247	
218.2.187.199	
218.21.89.224	
218.2.202.54	
218.2.202.98	
218.22.141.172	
218.24.111.12	
218.242.112.115	
218.246.236.64	
218.5.208.37	
218.56.8.160	
218.68.245.28	
218.69.202.171	
218.71.165.101	
218.72.133.97	
218.72.135.189	
218.72.209.89	
218.72.211.114	
218.72.217.112	
218.73.11.88	
218.73.15.165	
218.73.15.215	
218.73.15.41	
218.73.2.125	
218.74.215.25	
218.7.44.111	
218.7.44.188	
218.7.44.239	
218.7.44.5	
218.74.76.34	
218.74.76.36	
218.74.77.219	
218.75.0.246	
218.75.197.110	
218.76.110.186	
218.76.236.46	
218.76.236.78	
218.77.53.179	
218.80.200.10	
218.84.123.104	
218.85.61.148	
218.88.11.170	
218.88.1.140	
218.88.12.113	
218.88.12.171	
218.88.13.208	
218.88.16.44	
218.88.16.5	
218.88.3.112	
218.88.3.24	
218.88.64.144	
218.88.7.196	
218.88.8.61	

218.89.146.119
218.92.217.30
218.9.228.241
218.93.134.227
218.93.42.110
218.93.48.90
218.93.57.68
218.93.58.133
218.93.59.83
218.93.91.127
218.93.91.7
218.94.63.194
218.98.103.76
219.128.33.217
219.128.34.205
219.128.35.176
219.130.241.79
219.130.40.150
219.130.5.209
219.130.5.27
219.137.56.237
219.137.57.137
219.137.70.68
219.137.71.149
219.139.29.234
219.139.66.196
219.140.91.124
219.140.95.161
219.145.162.51
219.153.118.186
219.233.102.97
219.72.254.18
220.160.15.107
220.173.11.220
220.173.13.165
220.173.17.142
220.173.20.118
220.173.22.222
220.173.55.171
220.173.8.131
220.174.168.75
220.174.170.176
220.175.17.226
220.175.19.66
220.185.139.233
220.185.142.245
220.185.143.171
220.185.144.86
220.185.146.184
220.185.150.168
220.185.151.235
220.185.152.6
220.185.153.45
220.185.154.194
220.185.154.251
220.185.154.90
220.185.158.29
220.185.168.178
220.185.184.1
220.185.26.170
220.185.26.236
220.185.26.92
220.185.28.177
220.185.7.185
220.187.67.180
220.187.69.71
220.187.88.244
220.188.188.22
220.188.190.69
220.188.64.145
221.136.124.216
221.193.241.59
221.193.34.243
221.197.55.173

221.199.13.178	
221.200.88.52	
221.209.80.199	
221.209.80.76	
221.209.81.224	
221.209.81.68	
221.210.83.238	
221.210.83.59	
221.210.88.114	
221.210.89.239	
221.226.19.37	
221.228.67.230	
221.232.89.58	
221.233.49.125	
221.233.55.249	
221.233.65.147	
221.233.73.1	
221.7.192.11	
222.136.0.135	
222.136.0.212	
222.84.28.244	
222.84.72.11	
24.130.117.218	c-24-130-117-218.we.client2.attbi.com.
24.15.123.138	c-24-15-123-138.client.comcast.net.
24.201.201.176	
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