#!/bin/bash
#
# rc.firewall, ver 0.7.2
# http://www.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/tools/
# Rob McMillen <rvmcmil@cablespeed.com>
#
# CHANGES:
# 21 Apr 2003: Added STOP_OUT option to allow user to block
#              all outbound connections.  Think of this as the
#              honeynet safe mode.
# 29 Mar 2003: Changed default connection limits to day.
# 23 Mar 2003: Fixed a bug in the MANAGEMENT_IFACE connection. 
#              It prevented use of this interface when restricting
#              firewall communications.  Also added SEBEK_DST_PORT
#              to let the user identify which port SEBEK is sending
#              to via the use of udp, and added SEBEK_LOG so the user
#              can decide if he wants to log (yes) or not (no).
#              Made the following defaults:
#					RESTRICT="yes"
# 					MANAGER="192.168.0.0/24"
# 12 Mar 2003: Added PATH variable.  You no longer have to tell
#              the script where the executables live.
# 02 Mar 2003: Removed LAN_IP_RANGE to make it work with bridge
#              mode.  Also moved the broadcast and dhcp rules
#              before the test for inbound traffic in order to 
#              ensure broacast do not flood our logs and are 
#              allowed to pass in bridge mode.
# 27 Jan 2003: Added rules and variables (SEBEK and SEBEK_DST_IP) to
#              compensate for sebek traffic.
# 22 Jan 2003: Added the OUTBOUND CONN TCP label to outbound RELATED
#              traffic.
# 13 Jan 2003: Made some fixes to allow ESTABLISHED and RELATED traffic
#              back into the management interface.
# 10 Jan 2003: Added ip_queue checking if QUEUE is enabled, and modified
#              TCP logging statement to increase number of TCPRATE possible.
# 04 Jan 2003: Added rule to log Honeypot to Honeypot activity without 
#              implementing connection limits for those conversations.  
#              Added Allow all OUTPUT on loopback to enable the firewall to 
#              talk to itself during restricted Mode.
# 20 Dec 2002: Added some code to detect if ipchains is running.  If so, 
#              flush the tables; remove the module; and continue as usual.
# 19 Nov 2002: Restricted Firewall Outbound traffic see the TCP_ALLOWED_OUT 
#              and UDP_ALLOWED_OUT variables.
# 05 Nov 2002: Added MANAGER variable to restrict what ips have access
#              to the management interface.
# 01 Nov 2002: Added rules for management interface.  Added rule to 
#              allow outbound DHCP requests in bridge mode.  Moved 
#              variables around in an effort to better organize them
#              into a logical order.  Changed DNS query handling.
# 20 Oct 2002: Changed Variable names and grouped like variables
#              together.  Removed brctl_IFACE var.
# 
# PURPOSE
# To deploy Data Control requirements for a Honeynet deployment.
# This script uses IPTables to create a gateway that counts inbound
# and outbound connections and  blocks connections once a limit
# has been met.  Also has the capability to work with Snort-Inline.
# Script can work in either GenI(routing) or GenII(bridging) mode.
# For more about Honeynets, refer to
#
#        http://www.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/
#
# REQUIREMENTS
# In order for the genII script to work, your kernel must 
# be compiled with bride and bridge firewall support.
# Red Hat kernel 2.4.18-3 has this by default, most other
# kernels do not.  If yours does not, you will most likely
# need to patch and recompile your kernel.  You can find the
# patch at
#      http://bridge.sourceforge.net/download.html
#
# You will also need bridge utilities to allow this script to
# enable/configure bridging.  I used bridge-utils-0.9.3-4 during
# the testing of this script.
#
#
# INSTALLATION
# Once you have configured the variables of this script, you 
# simply execute this script.  It calls on IPTables and
# does everything for you (nice, huh? :).  You must have IPTables 
# installed on your system, and kernel version 2.4.x.
#
#
# MODE is the mode the firewall will use to operate.  There are
#    two possible values at this time: nat, bridge.  "nat" is GenI
#    where your gateway is routing in layer3.  "bridge" is GenII
#    where your gateway is bridging in layer2.  Of these two 
#    options, "bridge" is the prefered, more secure MODE.
#
# MODE="nat" In this mode, the firewall will translate each ip
#    in the PUBLIC_IP variable to each ip in the HPOT_IP variable.
#    Order is important, so make sure you place the ips in the 
#    variables as you would like them translated.  For example,
#    PUBLIC_IP="192.168.1.1 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3"
#    HPOT_IP="192.168.0.1 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.3"
#
#    will translate as follows:
#    192.168.1.1 => 192.168.0.1
#    192.168.1.2 => 192.168.0.2
#    192.168.1.3 => 192.168.0.3
#
#    Each variable is a space delimited list; therefore, you can have
#    as many as you want (or as many as an interface can have aliases).
#
#    The following variables must match the setting for the translated
#    network.  In the example above, they would be the settings of the
#    192.168.0.* network
#
#    LAN_BCAST_ADDRESS="192.168.0.255"
#
# MODE="bridge" In this mode, the firewall will act as a bridge, 
#    bridging and bridge firewalling will need to be compiled into the
#    kernel.  Default kernel for Redhat 7.3 (2.4.18-3) has it, but its
#    upgrade does not.  All other default kernels do not support IPtables
#    in bridging mode.  Therefore, your bridge will allow everything in and 
#    everything out,  completely bypassing your firewall rules.  
#
#    The following variables must match the settings for the bridged
#    network.  If both sides of the bridge are on 10.0.0.*,
#
#    LAN_BCAST_ADDRESS="192.168.1.255"
#
#
#    NOTE:  A quick check to ensure you have the LAN variables correct
#           is to check /var/log/messages.  If you see logs stating
#           SPOOFED SOURCE, you probably have them set wrong.  Also,
#           make sure your Honeypot default gateway is set to the 
#           firewall internal interface when in nat mode and the 
#           border router or routing device when in bridge mode.


#### If you want to see all the commands or which command is giving your
#       problems, remove the comment below.
#set -x


#*************************************************************************
# USER VARIABLE SECTION
#*************************************************************************

###############
# COMMON VARS #
###############

# The MODE variable tells the script to #setup a bridge HoneyWall
# or a NATing HoneyWall.
#MODE="nat"
MODE="bridge"

# A space delimited list of honeypots IPs (public IP)
# If you are in "bridge" mode, this is the list of your 
# honeypot IP's that will be behind the bridge.  If you are
# in "nat" mode, this is the list of public IPs you will
# be using for IP address translation.  Still confused?  Its
# the list of IPs the hackers will attack.
PUBLIC_IP="192.168.0.144"


### Variable for external network
INET_IFACE="eth0"                       # Firewall Public interface

### Variables for internal network
LAN_IFACE="eth1"                       # Firewall interface on internal network
LAN_BCAST_ADDRESS="192.168.0.255"      # IP Broadcast range for internal network

### IPTables script can be used with the Snort-Inline filter
### You can find the current release at
###  http://www.honeynet.org/papers/honeynet/tools/
#QUEUE="yes"            # Use experimental QUEUE support
QUEUE="no"              # Do not use experimental QUEUE support

### Set the connection outbound limits for different protocols.
SCALE="day"             # second, minute, hour, etc.
TCPRATE="15"            # Number of TCP connections per $SCALE
UDPRATE="20"            # Number of UDP connections per $SCALE
ICMPRATE="50"           # Number of ICMP connections per $SCALE
OTHERRATE="15"          # Number of other IP connections per $SCALE

STOP_OUT="no"           # Set to yes if you don't want to allow any 
                        # outbound connections.  This setting will
                        # override all RATE options if set to 'yes'.
                        

### This section allows you to compensate for the use of sebek
#   on the honeynet.  Since sebek uses spoofed ips, sebek traffic
#   would clutter our logs with SPOOFED SOURCE entries.  Setting
#   it to yes, will drop all SEBEK_DST_IP ips before it has a 
#   chance to hit the SPOOFED SOURCE ip rule.  It can also be used 
#   as a hacker activity monitor by labeling this traffic as SEBEK
#   in the firewall rules.
#SEBEK="yes"
SEBEK="no"

# Allows the user to decide whether to drop the sebek packets or 
# allow them to be sent outside of the Honeynet.
#SEBEK_FATE="ACCEPT"
SEBEK_FATE="DROP"

SEBEK_DST_IP="10.0.0.1"
SEBEK_DST_PORT="1101"

#SEBEK_LOG="yes"
SEBEK_LOG="no"

######################
# END OF COMMON VARS #
######################

##########################
# VARIABLES FOR NAT MODE #
##########################
#  You use these variables ONLY if you are using NAT mode.   
#  If you are in bridging mode, then these variables will
#  not be used.
# 

ALIAS_MASK="255.255.255.0"         # Network mask to be used alias

HPOT_IP="192.168.171.129"  	   # Space delimited list of Honeypot ips
                                   # NOTE: MUST HAVE SAME NUMBER OF IPS AS 
                                   # PUBLIC_IP VARIABLE.
#############################
# END OF NAT MODE VARIABLES #
#############################


##################################
# SPECIAL CONSIDERATION VARIABLE #
##################################

# You may want to allow unrestricted outbound DNS access.
# If you want to restrict the hosts that can access public dns servers,
# set the DNS_HOST variable to the ip of the honeypots allowed to 
# make queries.  Otherwise, leave it blank and the proper set of
# ips will be assigned in order to allow all of your honeypots to 
# make dns queries. 
DNS_HOST=""

# List of DNS servers your honeypot(s) are allowed to go to.
# This is once a gain a space delimited list.
DNS_SVRS=""

######################################
# VARIABLES FOR MANAGEMENT INTERFACE #
######################################


# Interface for remote management.  If set to br0, it will assign
# MANAGE_IP to the bridge logical interface and allow its use
# as a management interface.  If you do not want to use a 
#  management interface, set it to "none"
#MANAGE_IFACE="br0"                
#MANAGE_IFACE="eth2"                
MANAGE_IFACE="none"                

MANAGE_IP="192.168.0.25"           # IP of management Interface
MANAGE_NETMASK="255.255.255.0"     # Netmask of management Interface

# Space delimited list of tcp ports allowed into the management interface
ALLOWED_TCP_IN="22"

# IP allowed to connect to the management interface
# If set to "any", it will allow anyone to attempt to connect.
# The notation ip/mask or a space delimited list of ips are
# allowed.
#MANAGER="any"  
#MANAGER="192.168.0.0/24"  


####################
# END OF MANAGE VARS
####################

##########################################################
# VARIABLES THAT RESTRICT WHAT THE FIREWALL CAN SEND OUT #
##########################################################

# This variable will limit outbound Firewall connections
# to ports identified in the ALLOWED_TCP_OUT and 
# ALLOWED_UDP_OUT variables.  If set to yes, it will 
# restrict the firewall.  If set to no, it will allow all
# outbound connections generated by the firewall.
# NOTE:  There must be a management interface in bridge 
# mode in order to have a firewall interface to restrict.

#RESTRICT="no"
RESTRICT="yes"

ALLOWED_UDP_OUT="53 123"
ALLOWED_TCP_OUT="22 43 80 443"

##########################
# END RESTRICT VARIABLES #
##########################

############################################
# LOCATION OF PROGRAMS USED BY THIS SCRIPT #
############################################ 
PATH="/sbin:/usr/sbin:/usr/local/sbin:/bin"

####################
# END OF PROG VARS #
####################

#*************************************************************************
# END OF USER VARIABLE SECTION (DO NOT EDIT BEYOND THIS POINT)
#*************************************************************************

#########
# First, confirm that IPChains is NOT running.  If
# it is running, clear the IPChains rules, remove the kernel 
# module, and warn the end user.

lsmod | grep ipchain
IPCHAINS=$?

if [ "$IPCHAINS" = 0 ]; then
  echo ""
  echo "Dooh, IPChains is currently running! IPTables is required by"
  echo "the rc.firewall script. IPChains will be unloaded to allow"
  echo "IPTables to run.  It is recommened that you permanently"
  echo "disable IPChains in the /etc/rc.d startup scripts and enable"
  echo "IPTables instead."
  ipchains -F
  rmmod ipchains
fi

#########
# Flush rules
#
iptables -F
iptables -F -t nat
iptables -F -t mangle
iptables -X

echo ""

##########
# Let's setup the firewall according to the Mode selected: bridge or nat
#
if [ $MODE = "bridge" ]
then

   echo "Starting up Bridging mode."

   #########
   # Let's clean up the bridge.  This will only work if this script
   #   started the bridge.
   #
   brctl delif br0 ${INET_IFACE} 2> /dev/null
   brctl delif br0 ${LAN_IFACE} 2> /dev/null
   ifconfig br0 down 2> /dev/null
   brctl delbr br0 2> /dev/null

   #########
   # Let's make sure our interfaces don't have ip information
   #
   ifconfig $INET_IFACE 0.0.0.0 up -arp
   ifconfig $LAN_IFACE 0.0.0.0 up -arp


   #########
   # Let's start the bridge
   #
   brctl addbr br0
   brctl addif br0 ${LAN_IFACE}
   brctl addif br0 ${INET_IFACE}

   # Let's make sure our bridge is not sending out
   #   BPDUs (part of the spanning tree protocol).
   brctl stp br0 off

   if [ "$MANAGE_IFACE" = "br0" ]
   then
      ifconfig br0 $MANAGE_IP netmask $MANAGE_NETMASK up
   else
      ifconfig br0 0.0.0.0 up -arp
   fi
      
elif [ $MODE = "nat" ]
then

   echo "Starting up Routing mode and enabling Network Address Translation."

   i=0
   z=1
   tempPub=( $PUBLIC_IP ) 

   for host in $HPOT_IP; do

      # Bring up eth aliases
      ifconfig $INET_IFACE:${z} ${tempPub[$i]} netmask ${ALIAS_MASK} up

      # Ensure proper NATing is performed for all honeypots
      iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s ${host} -j SNAT --to-source ${tempPub[$i]}
      iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d ${tempPub[$i]} -j DNAT --to-destination ${host}
      let "i += 1"
      let "z += 1"
   done
fi

# Let's figure out dns
if [ $DNS_HOST -z ]
then
   if [ $MODE = "bridge" ]
   then
      DNS_HOST=$PUBLIC_IP
   else
      DNS_HOST=$HPOT_IP
   fi
fi 


#########
# Load all required IPTables modules
#

### Needed to initially load modules
/sbin/depmod -a

### Add iptables target LOG.
modprobe ipt_LOG

### Add iptables QUEUE support (Experimental)
if test $QUEUE = "yes"
then
   # Insert kernel mod
   modprobe ip_queue

  # check to see if it worked, if not exit with error
  lsmod | grep ip_queue
  IPQUEUE=$?

  if [ "$IPQUEUE" = 1 ]; then
    echo ""
    echo "It appears you do not have the ip_queue kernel module compiled"
    echo "for your kernel.  This module is required for Snort-Inline and"
    echo "QUEUE capabilities.  You either have to disable QUEUE, or compile"
    echo "the ip_queue kernel module for your kernel.  This module is part"
    echo "of the kernel source."
    exit
  fi

 
   echo "Enabling Snort-Inline capabilities, make sure Snort-Inline is"
   echo "running in -Q mode, or all outbound traffic will be blocked"
fi

### Support for connection tracking of FTP and IRC.
modprobe ip_conntrack_ftp
modprobe ip_conntrack_irc

### Enable ip_forward 
echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward

### Create protocol handling chains
if [ -z $STOP_OUT ] || [ "$STOP_OUT" != "yes" ]
then
   iptables -N tcpHandler
   iptables -N udpHandler
   iptables -N icmpHandler
   iptables -N otherHandler
fi


#    Forward Chain: 
#    Some of these rules may look redundant, but they allow us to catch 
#    'other' protocols.


#    Internet -> honeypot  -  
#    This logs all inbound new connections and we must
#    specifically allow all inbound traffic because 
#    the default policy for forwarding traffic 
#    will be drop.  This will ensure if something 
#    goes wrong with outbound connections, we 
#    default to drop.
#
#    Also, in case we have something listening to the QUEUE, we
#    will send all packets via the QUEUE.


# Since this is a bridge, we want to allow broadcast.  By default, we allow all
# inbound traffic (including broadcast).  We also want to allow outbound broadcast
# (such as NetBIOS) but we do not want to count it as an outbound session.  So
# we allow it here *before* we begin counting outbound connections
#iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -d ${LAN_BCAST_ADDRESS} -j LOG --log-prefix "Legal Broadcast: "
iptables -A FORWARD -d ${LAN_BCAST_ADDRESS} -j ACCEPT
#iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -d 255.255.255.255 -j LOG --log-prefix "Legal Broadcast: "
iptables -A FORWARD -d 255.255.255.255 -j ACCEPT


### Inbound TCP
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p tcp -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "INBOUND TCP: " 
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p tcp -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT 
   
### Inbound UDP
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p udp -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "INBOUND UDP: " 
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p udp -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT 

### Inbound ICMP
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p icmp -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "INBOUND ICMP: " 
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -p icmp -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT 

### Inbound anything else
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "INBOUND OTHER: " 
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT 

# The remainder of established connections will be ACCEPTED.  The rules above 
#   are required in order to log new inbound connections.
iptables -A FORWARD -i $INET_IFACE -j ACCEPT 


#  Okay, this is where the magic all happens.  All outbound traffic is counted,
#  logged, and limited here.   Targets (called Handlers) are what actually limit
#  the connections.  All 'Handlers' are defined at the bottom of the script.

#   Egress filtering, don't want to let our compromised honeypot send spoofed packets.
#   Stops most outbound DoS attacks.  However, we might want to allow our honeypots to 
#   use dhcp to get an ip while in bridge mode.
if [ $MODE = "bridge" ]
then
   iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -p udp --sport 68 -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 67 -j LOG --log-prefix "DHCP OUT REQUEST: "
   iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -p udp --sport 68 -d 255.255.255.255 --dport 67 -j ACCEPT
fi

# This rule is for use with sebek.  If sebek is used, and we don't want
#   the logs filled by SPOOFED SOURCE entries because sebek uses spoofed
#   ips, we should drop all traffic in the sebek ip range.
if [ "$SEBEK" = "yes" ]
then
	if [ "$SEBEK_LOG" = "yes" ]
	then
		iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -p udp -d $SEBEK_DST_IP --dport $SEBEK_DST_PORT -j LOG --log-prefix "SEBEK"
	fi
	iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -p udp -d $SEBEK_DST_IP --dport $SEBEK_DST_PORT -j $SEBEK_FATE 
fi


### DNS / NTP Perhaps one of your honeypots needs consistent
### outbound access to provide internal service.
for srvr in ${DNS_SVRS}; do
    for host in ${DNS_HOST}; do
        iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LAN_IFACE -s ${host} -d ${srvr} --dport 53 -j LOG --log-prefix "Legal DNS: "
        iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LAN_IFACE -s ${host} -d ${srvr} --dport 53 -j ACCEPT 
    done
done

if [ $MODE = "nat" ]
then
    LIMIT_IP=$HPOT_IP
elif [ $MODE = "bridge" ]
then
    LIMIT_IP=$PUBLIC_IP
fi

### Count and limit all other outbound connections
if [ -z $STOP_OUT ] || [ "$STOP_OUT" != "yes" ]
then
   for host in ${LIMIT_IP}; do

# This will ensure we don't restrict Honeypots talking to eachother, and
#   we don't log them as outbound connections (in bridge mode, the 
#   firewall sees all packets; therefore, we have to make sure it doesn't
#   log packets incorrectly and give false positives).  
#      If you do not want to see this log, comment out the logging rule.  
#   You will still need the ACCEPT rule to ensure they honeypots can talk 
#   to eachother freely.
      iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -o $LAN_IFACE -j LOG --log-prefix "Honeypot -> Honeypot: "
      iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -o $LAN_IFACE -j ACCEPT

#  TCP
#         This next rule is the connection limiter.  If it has not exceeded 
#         the limit, the packet will be sent to the tcpHandler.  The 
#         tcpHandler will log and either QUEUE or ACCEPT depending on 
#         the Architecture selected.
#
#      NOTE: The purpose of the drop rule is to ensure we can catch 'other' 
#         protocols that enter our network.  If this statement is not here
#         we will get false log entries stating Drop other after xxx
#         connections.
      iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit ${TCPRATE}/${SCALE} --limit-burst ${TCPRATE} -s ${host} -j tcpHandler
      iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 1/${SCALE} --limit-burst 1  -s ${host} -j LOG --log-prefix "Drop TCP after ${TCPRATE} attempts" 
      iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -s ${host} -j DROP 

   # This rule is for Mike Clark in order to give him RELATED information.  For
   #   example, this will tell him the data channel related to an ftp command
   #   channel of a connection.
      iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state RELATED -s ${host} -j tcpHandler

#
#  UDP - see TCP comments above.
#
      iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit ${UDPRATE}/${SCALE} --limit-burst ${UDPRATE} -s ${host} -j udpHandler
      iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 1/${SCALE} --limit-burst 1 -s ${host} -j LOG --log-prefix "Drop udp after ${UDPRATE} attempts" 
      iptables -A FORWARD -p udp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -s ${host} -j DROP 


#
#  ICMP - see TCP comments above.
#
      iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit ${ICMPRATE}/${SCALE} --limit-burst ${ICMPRATE} -s ${host} -j icmpHandler
      iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 1/${SCALE} --limit-burst 1 -s ${host} -j LOG --log-prefix "Drop icmp after ${ICMPRATE} attempts"
      iptables -A FORWARD -p icmp -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -s ${host} -j DROP 


#
#  EVERYTHING ELSE - see TCP comments above.
#
      iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit ${OTHERRATE}/${SCALE} --limit-burst ${OTHERRATE} -s ${host} -j otherHandler
      iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 1/${SCALE} --limit-burst 1 -s ${host} -j LOG --log-prefix "Drop other after ${OTHERRATE} attempts"

   done

# This portion of the script will ensure that established or related 
#    connections that were allowed, continue to work.  If these lines 
#    are not here, only the first packet of each connection that hasn't 
#    reached the limit will be allowed in because we are dropping
#    all outbound connections by default.
   if test $QUEUE = "yes"
      then
      iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j QUEUE 
   fi
   iptables -A FORWARD -i $LAN_IFACE -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 

###  These define the handlers that actually limit outbound connection.
#
# tcpHandler - The only packets that should make it into these chains are new 
#                connections, as long as the host has not exceeded their limit.
#
   iptables -A tcpHandler -j LOG --log-prefix "OUTBOUND CONN TCP: "
   if test $QUEUE = "yes"
      then
      iptables -A tcpHandler -j QUEUE 
   fi
   iptables -A tcpHandler -j ACCEPT 


#
# udpHandler - see tcpHandler comments above.
#
   iptables -A udpHandler -j LOG --log-prefix "OUTBOUND CONN UDP: "
   if test $QUEUE = "yes"
      then
      iptables -A udpHandler -j QUEUE 
   fi
   iptables -A udpHandler -j ACCEPT 


#
# icmpHandler - see tcpHandler comments above.
#
   iptables -A icmpHandler -j LOG --log-prefix "OUTBOUND CONN ICMP: " 
   if test $QUEUE = "yes"
      then
      iptables -A icmpHandler -j QUEUE 
   fi
   iptables -A icmpHandler -j ACCEPT 


#
# otherHandler - see tcpHandler comments above.
#
   iptables -A otherHandler -j LOG --log-prefix "OUTBOUND CONN OTHER: "
   if test $QUEUE = "yes"
      then
      iptables -A otherHandler -j QUEUE 
   fi
   iptables -A otherHandler -j ACCEPT 
fi # STOP_OUT

iptables -A INPUT -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

### Lets make sure our firewall can talk to itself
iptables -A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT


##############################
# MANAGEMENT INTERFACE RULES #
##############################
if [ $MANAGE_IFACE != "none" ]
then
   for ports in $ALLOWED_TCP_IN; do

      if [ "$MANAGER" = "any" ]
      then
         #iptables -A INPUT -i $MANAGE_IFACE -p tcp --dport $ports -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "MANAGE port:$ports=>"
         iptables -A INPUT -i $MANAGE_IFACE -p tcp --dport $ports -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
      else
         for ips in $MANAGER; do
            #iptables -A INPUT -i $MANAGE_IFACE -p tcp -s $ips --dport $ports -m state --state NEW -j LOG --log-prefix "MANAGE port:$ports=>"
            iptables -A INPUT -i $MANAGE_IFACE -p tcp -s $ips --dport $ports -m state --state NEW -j ACCEPT
         done
      fi

   done

	iptables -A OUTPUT -o $MANAGE_IFACE -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT

fi

### Set default policies for the INPUT, FORWARD and OUTPUT chains
# By default, drop all connections sent to firewall
iptables -P INPUT DROP 

# If we selected to restrict the firewall, lets implement it here.
if [ $RESTRICT = "yes" ]
then

   for port in $ALLOWED_TCP_OUT; do
      iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --dport $port -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
   done

   for port in $ALLOWED_UDP_OUT; do
      iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp --dport $port -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT 
   done

   # By default, drop firewall outbound connection
   iptables -P OUTPUT DROP 

else

   # By default, accept firewall outbound connection
   iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 

fi


# By default, if FORWARDED connections are not within limit, DROP.
# This is a fail close policy, and more secure.
iptables -P FORWARD DROP